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Abstract. This paper analyzes whether international material input structures have converged 
or diverged over time. Pooled variances for 25 industries were obtained from OECD input-
output tables in constant prices for nine countries over the period 1971-1990. It is found that 
high-tech industries were mainly characterized by divergence of material input structures, 
whereas convergence was found for many low-tech, more mature industries. In line with 
studies on (labor) productivity growth rates, convergence of material input structures was 
prevalent in the 1970s, while divergence dominated in the 1980s.    
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past couple of decades, globalization has become a keyword to describe the 
increased interrelatedness of nations with respect to trade and knowledge diffusion. The 
question we address in this note is how production processes of industrialized countries have 
changed as a consequence of international technological linkages. Using information from 
input-output tables, we analyze for each industry whether the structures of material inputs 
have converged, or not. In our definition, convergence takes place if the diversity (or, 
variability) of production technologies used across countries decreases.1 In this respect, our 
convergence concept resembles the -convergence concept that is well known in studies of 
labor productivity and total factor productivity convergence (see, e.g. Bernard and Jones, 
1996a). 
In this paper, we will view changes in material input structures in the light of so-called 
“technology gap” models of growth (see, e.g., Fagerberg, 1987). In these models, two sources 
of change are highlighted: innovation and technological catch-up. Suppose a situation in 
which countries use identical material input structures in an industry. Any innovation will 
then induce a tendency to divergence, since one or a few national industries start adopting a 
different production technology that is perceived as an improvement over current practice. 
Later on, technology flows from technological leaders to followers (see, for instance, Coe & 
Helpman, 1995, and Verspagen, 1997) may induce technological catch-up, since latecomer 
countries might learn how to produce according to the technologies operated by the original 
 
1 To be more exact, we propose the reduction in the pooled variance of the material input coefficients of an 
industry as an indicator of convergence. 
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innovator(s). Ceteris paribus, material input structures will become more alike, or, in other 
words, convergence will prevail.2
In the “real world”, many of such processes are simultaneously at work. Convergence 
(divergence) occurs in a given time period if the effects of innovations by the leader are 
smaller (larger) than the effects of catch-up through assimilation of diffused technology by 
follower countries. Empirical analyses should provide answers to the question whether 
convergence or divergence  prevails.3 In this note, we use data from the OECD input-output 
tables in constant prices for nine countries over the period 1971-1990, to compute our 
convergence indicator for 25 industries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a more detailed 
presentation of the basic technology gap model. The interactions between innovation and 
technological catch-up are formalized and hypotheses about the typical industries for which 
convergence resp. divergence of material input structures should prevail are formed. Section 3 
presents the convergence indicator we propose. Section 4 discusses the data we use and 
Section 5 deals with the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Technology gap models and convergence 
 
In traditional neoclassical economics (Solow, 1956), international differences in levels of 
labor productivity were seen as transitory phenomena. Due to more attractive rates of return 
to capital in low-productivity countries, investment rates were thought to be higher than in 
 
2 The issue of convergence of technologies has been studied quite extensively, but almost exclusively on the 
basis of trends in (labor or multifactor) productivity. Baumol (1986) is a classic contribution in this respect.  
3 Hoen (2002, Chapter 7) contains a first study, approaching the question from the perspective of trade theory, 
however. 
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high-productivity countries. Ultimately, all countries will tend towards the same productivity 
level. If (exogenous) technological progress is taken into account (countries increase their 
productivity at a constant pace), convergence towards a steady-state gap of productivity levels 
will result, and growth rates will tend to equalize. Characteristic of these models is that 
technology is considered to be common to all countries. Differences in savings rates are 
considered the main cause of productivity growth differentials. 
In the technology gap literature (Fagerberg, 1987, and Verspagen, 1991, are seminal 
studies, see e.g. Lim and McAleer, 2004, for a recent contribution), a different approach is 
proposed. High-productivity countries attain productivity growth by means of innovation. 
Since the knowledge pertaining to these innovations is assumed to disseminate slowly (or, at 
least, not instantaneously), low-productivity countries will initially lose ground, both in terms 
of productivity levels and growth rates. As soon as low-productivity countries start to 
“benefit” from their technological backwardness (for instance, by imitating high-productivity 
processes and products) catch-up can occur. Thus, the dynamics of the productivity gap 
between high-productivity countries and low-productivity countries is basically viewed as the 
outcome of two opposing forces: innovation by the leaders and assimilation by followers. 
Let us for simplicity assume that there is just one productivity leader, country 0. The 
productivity followers are denoted by i (i=1, ..., n). Then, the basic technology gap model is 
given by 



+	=	 INI
INI
i
iii y
yyy
0
00 ln)( && (1) 
 
where dots denote growth rates and the superscript INI indicates a value in the initial period. y
stands for productivity. The constants i (i=0,...,n) and i (i=1,...,n) denote country-specific 
abilities to innovate (i0), and abilities to assimilate technology that originated with the 
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leader (iF0), respectively.4 Countries that are unable to assimilate any technology will be 
characterized by i=0. The better country i is at assimilating (for instance due to a relatively 
well-educated workforce), the more negative i will be.  
For reasons of exposition, we assume that the leader’s ability to innovate leads to a 
stable, continuous flow of innovations that yields productivity growth at rate 0. Furthermore, 
let us assume that follower countries cannot innovate at all by themselves (i=0, i=1,...,n). 
The equilibrium gaps for the productivity levels can now easily be found by setting the left 
hand side of (1) equal to zero, that is -in equilibrium- the leader and the followers experience 
identical productivity growth rates. Solving for the right hand side yields: 
 
( )iey
yi  /
*
0
*
0= (2) 
 
Thus, the equilibrium gaps for productivity levels are larger the faster innovations arrive in 
the leader country and the smaller the rates of assimilation in follower countries are.  
In many cases, productivity growth rates due to innovation as captured by 0 are not 
stable over time (see, e.g. Freeman & Soete, 1997). As a consequence, the equilibrium gap in 
(2) and, therefore, actual productivity gaps will change over time. In the early stages of 
product life cycles, productivity growth is often slow (0 small), due to the initially limited 
scale at which innovative processes are used or innovated products are sold. Later on, 
productivity growth picks up (0), since the innovation has gained more popularity. Finally, 
at the time processes and products reach the stage of maturity, the rate of innovation usually 
goes down (0), because opportunities for further improvement get fished out. If it is 
 
4 Note that the ratio INIINIi yy 0/ in (1) is smaller than one.  
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assumed that the abilities to assimilate remain constant over time, the product life cycle can 
be held responsible for changes in the distribution of gaps, as reflected in its variance. 
In the traditional technology gap literature described so far, technologies are indicated 
by productivity levels. In this study, we adopt a different perspective and use material input 
structures as indicators of technology. If assimilation of leading technologies is predominant, 
the industry-specific input structures will become more similar across countries. If innovation 
is a more important factor, however, the contrary is true. The innovating industry will adopt 
processes characterized by an input structure that deviates from what its foreign counterparts 
do. As a consequence, input structures will become more heterogeneous.  
In the literature on productivity convergence, scholars often investigate trends in 
measures of dispersion, like the distribution’s variance. If the dispersion in productivity or 
income levels is decreasing, Bernard and Jones (1996a), Sala-i-Martin (1996) and Proietti 
(2005), among others, denote this as -convergence. Several measures of dispersion have 
been used in the literature, ranging from variances, standard deviations, and standard 
deviations of transformed variables to weighted or unweighted coefficients of variation. In 
this paper, we will focus on intertemporal comparisons of variances, because statistical theory 
provides some natural yardsticks for assessing -convergence and -divergence for material 
input structures.  
In the technology gap model represented by (1), the variance of equilibrium gaps is 
likely to increase (-divergence) during the transition from the early stage to the stage of 
growth. High-productivity innovators will leap forward, while more backward countries will 
stay further behind, which implies increased dispersion of productivity levels.  During the 
subsequent transition from the stage of growth to the maturity stage, however, the variance of 
equilibrium gaps could well decrease (-convergence). Since adaptation to the equilibrium 
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distribution of gaps is generally considered as a slow process due to relatively modest abilities 
to assimilate, actual convergence and divergence processes are long-run phenomena. 
 In the next section, we will outline how we adapt a measure of -convergence in the 
literature on productivity convergence to study convergence of material input structures at the 
industry level.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
We base our analysis on input-output tables in constant prices. From these, we obtain the 
elements ijz with the (domestic plus imported) intermediate deliveries from industry i to 
industry j (i, j = 1,…,n) and domestic gross outputs jx in industry j. The elements 
jijij xza /= denote the input coefficients of material input i per unit of output in industry j.
Convergence (respectively divergence) of material input structures in industry j would imply 
that the jth columns of the matrices A of input coefficients for the various countries become 
more (respectively less) similar. In line with the concept of  -convergence for productivity 
levels outlined in the previous section, we analyze the changes in the similarity of the 
columns over time.5
Let the countries be denoted by the index r = 1,…, tm and note that the number of 
countries included in the sample differs over time. Then for each industry j (= 1,…,n) at time 
t, we have 
 

=
		=
tm
r
ij
r
ij
t
ij tatamtv 1
2)]()([1
1)( , with 
=
= t
m
r
r
ij
t
ij tamta 1
)(1)( (3) 
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8
This expression reflects the extent to which the input coefficient aij differs from the average 
value computed for the full set of countries. If the material input structures for industry j
would be exactly identical across countries, vij(t) would be zero. The use of any input I as a 
proportion of gross output is the same for each country.  
If some elements aij vary across countries for industry j, a summary measure is needed 
to indicate the dissimilarity of international production technologies. The pooled variance, 
obtained by taking the average of the variances vij(t), is the most straightforward candidate 
summary measure, i.e. 
 

=
=
n
i
ijj tvntv 1
)(1)( (4) 
 
If )1( +tv j is “substantially” smaller than )(tv j , we will speak of convergence between 
period t and t+1. This resembles the conventional notion of -convergence, introduced in the 
previous section: from period t to period t+1, technologies have become more alike, most 
probably as a consequence of technology assimilation. Analogously, we will take a )1( +tv j
that is “substantially” larger than )(tv j as an indication of divergence between t and t+1. As a 
yardstick, we use the corresponding F-statistic. For example (also other percentiles will be 
used), 
 
• convergence took place if )05.0()(/)1( )1( )1( 1 		+<+ ttmn mnjj Ftvtv
• divergence took place if )95.0()(/)1( )1( )1( 1 		+>+ ttmnmnjj Ftvtv
5 Appendix B contains a simplified illustration of the calculations involved. 
Page 8 of 19
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
9
It should be stressed that we use the critical values of F-distributions only as a yardstick to 
distinguish between “large” and “small” differences. The application of an F-test to decide 
whether the differences are significantly different (in a statistical sense), would require 
unrealistically strong assumptions. That is, we would have to assume that the observations 
)(ta rij are normally distributed with mean )(tiµ and a common variance )(2 t . Moreover, 
the observations would need to be independent across countries r and supplier industries i. In 
particular the assumption regarding independency seems to be violated in reality, because 
country-specific substitution effects, for example, may play a role. Nevertheless, comparisons 
to critical values of F-distributions give sensible indicators of the strength of convergence or 
divergence processes.  
4. Data 
We study the changes in material input structures in the way outlined in the previous section 
on the basis of a set of national input-output tables compiled by the OECD (OECD, 1995). It 
contains input-output tables for ten developed countries, using a 35-industry classification.6
For each country, three to five tables are available, roughly for the period 1968-1990. 
Unfortunately, the years for which tables are compiled do not exactly coincide. We decided to 
 
6 These countries are Australia (AU), Canada (CA), Denmark (DK), France (FR), Germany (GE), Japan (JP), 
The Netherlands (NL), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (US). The OECD 
database also contains a single table for Italy. Since changes in tables are considered, we could not include 
Italy in our analysis. 
Page 9 of 19
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
10
follow the suggestion made in OECD (1995) to assign each table to a subperiod. Table 1 
presents this grouping of tables.7
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
Our analyses are based on the tables that contain all intermediate inputs, both domestically 
produced and imported (in the OECD database these tables are encoded as “TIOK”). This 
choice is in accordance with the idea that material input structures should resemble 
technologies of industries. Mere changes in the mix of domestically produced and imported 
inputs should not affect these representations, unless domestically produced inputs from 
supplying industry i would be different from imported inputs from industry i. Since the 
OECD constructed the tables according to an internationally harmonized industry 
classification, risks that substantial systematic differences affect the results are strongly 
reduced.  
The interindustry transactions recorded in the tables for any country are denominated 
in the national currency. Further, the tables are expressed in constant prices. As a 
consequence, information on (physical) quantities of inputs (which represent the material 
input structures we are interested in) is thus approximated as well as possible, because 
inflation and changes in exchange rates do not contaminate the coefficients.8
Since national statistical agencies did not construct their national input-output tables 
in exactly the same way, the OECD tables are not fully comparable. Some industries are not 
contained as separate entities in tables for some countries, whereas they do for others (see 
 
7 We decided to adopt the grouping suggested by OECD (1995, p. 7), except for one table. That is, we 
included UK(1979) in the third subperiod, whereas OECD (1995) assigned it to the second subperiod. Our 
grouping yields less variance within groups with respect to timing.  
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OECD, 1995, p. 12). To make the tables as comparable as possible we had to aggregate a 
limited number of industries. The aggregation scheme is included in Appendix A. We finally 
computed the pooled variances for 25 industries, each of them based on material input 
coefficients vectors that consist of 25 elements.  
 
5. Results 
 
Applying equations (3) and (4) to the OECD (1995) tables and using the specified criteria for 
convergence and divergence, yields the results documented in Table 2. The rightmost 
columns refer to trends over the entire period of analysis, i.e. 1971-1990. An overwhelming 
majority of industries (i.e., 19 out of 25) has experienced either convergence or divergence of 
material input structures, as measured by the yardstick of the 10th, respectively the 90th,
percentiles of the appropriate F-distributions.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
In particular, many manufacturing industries that are widely considered as “low-tech” –  such 
as textiles (4), wood products (5), paper (6), petroleum (8), and basic metals (11) – appear to 
have converged. Convergence is also found for primary industries – agriculture (1) and 
mining (2) – and for a limited number of services industries. This is in line with the prediction 
from the technology gap literature briefly discussed in Section 2, based on the argument that 
innovation by technological leaders has slowed down in these “mature” industries. The 
technology gap will thus be narrowed if the ability of follower countries to assimilate diffused 
 
8 It should be mentioned that the base years used for deflation are not identical for all countries, which may 
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technology has not decreased. This would yield clearcut tendencies towards convergence of 
the material input structures. 
 The results for most high-tech and medium-tech manufacturing industries support this 
explanation. Most industries that belong to this group – such as chemicals (7), plastics (9), 
machinery (13), ships (14), and transport equipment, (15) – show either divergence or no 
discernible tendency. An increase of the leaders’ innovation rates will widen the technology 
gap inducing divergence, if abilities to assimilate knowledge remain unaltered. A similar 
argument seems to hold for business services (24), an industry characterized by a high degree 
of organizational innovation.  
It should be noted, however, that we are not able to explain the findings for every 
industry. For example, the low-tech industries glass and stone (10) and metal products (12)  
show divergence, whereas the high-tech industry instruments (16) is found to have 
experienced convergent tendencies. Specialization might play a role in this (for example, 
metal products is characterized by a high degree of product differentiation which may be 
taken as an indication of specialization).  
Several generations of trade theories predict that countries will specialize in different 
production processes (Jones, 1956, Krugman, 1981, Grossman, 1992). The OECD input-
output tables, however, are rather aggregated, whereas specialization typically takes place at 
the more detailed level of “subindustries”. Each of these can be characterized by its own 
material input structure. Once such subindustries are aggregated into an industry, the 
subindustries in which a country is specialized will most strongly influence the structure of 
the (aggregate) industry. Changes in the input structure of an industry may therefore also be 
partly due to changes in the mix of its subindustries, as caused by changes in specialization 
patterns. The problem, however, is that an increase in specialization may lead to convergence 
 
affect our results. 
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in one case and to divergence in an other. Therefore, although specialization may play some 
role, it cannot be used as a factor to explain the observed patterns of convergence/divergence, 
because the direction of its effect cannot be ascertained.    
 Looking at the results for shorter subperiods, it is not surprising that a far more 
heterogeneous pattern is found than for the results over the entire period. The bottom row 
shows that an initial tendency towards convergence was gradually overturned. In the late 
1980s, divergence rather than convergence of material input structures was found most often. 
This result is in line with studies that focus on convergence and divergence of labor 
productivity levels (see, e.g., Bernard & Jones, 1996a, 1996b, and  Los & Timmer, 2005). 
From the perspective of single industries, only few show a more or less persistent 
development, such as agriculture (1), ships (14), other manufacturing (17), utilities (18) and 
government services (25). For the other industries, it is remarkable that subperiods with 
convergence are often followed by subperiods of divergence (and vice versa). These 
counteracting short-run effects certainly call for further analysis at a more detailed industry 
level. At the present level, they seem to have blurred the long-run tendencies indicated by the 
results for the entire period.      
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This note explored opportunities to incorporate changing patterns of material input structures 
into analyses of international convergence and divergence. For the period 1971-1990, the 
analysis based on pooled variances of input coefficients revealed that high-tech industries 
were mainly characterized by divergence of material input structures, whereas convergence 
was found for many low-tech, more mature industries. These results confirm hypotheses 
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derived from the literature on technology gap models. As is in line with studies that focus on 
convergence and divergence of (labor) productivity growth rates, convergence of material 
input structures was prevalent in the 1970s, while divergence dominated in the 1980s.    
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Appendix A: Industry classification for analyses based on OECD (1995) data 
No. Description OECD IO code ISIC Rev. 2 code 
1. Agriculture, forestry and fishery  1 1 
2. Mining and quarrying 2 2 
3. Food, beverage and tobacco 3 31 
4. Textiles, apparel and leather 4 32 
5. Wood products and furniture 5 33 
6. Paper, paper products and printing 6 34 
7. Chemicals, including drugs and medicines 7+8 351+352 
8. Petroleum and coal products 9 353+354 
9. Rubber and plastic products 10 355+356 
10. Non-metallic mineral products 11 36 
11. Basic metals 12+13 37 
12. Metal products 14 381 
13. Machinery, including electronics 15+16+17+18 382+383 
14. Shipbuilding and repairing 19 3841 
15. Other transport equipment 20+21+22 384-3841 
16. Professional goods 23 385 
17. Other manufacturing 24 39 
18. Electricity, gas and water 25 4 
19. Construction 26 5 
20. Wholesale and retail trade 27 61+62 
21. Restaurants and hotels 28 63 
22. Transport and storage services 29 71 
23. Communication services 30 72 
24. Financial and business services 31+32 8 
25. Community, social and government services 33+34+35 9 
Page 16 of 19
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
17
Appendix B: Illustration of computations 
 
Consider the following simplified tables with input coefficients, for the hypothetical countries 
A and B (mt=2, see equation (3)), for t=0 and t=1. 
 
Country A, t=0      Country B, t=0 
 1 2 3   1 2 3 
1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1 0.3 0.2 0.1
2 0.2 0.2 0.1 2 0.2 0.1 0.1
3 0.2 0.1 0.3 3 0.1 0.1 0.2
Country A, t=1      Country B, t=1 
 1 2 3   1 2 3 
1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1 0.2 0.3 0.1
2 0.2 0.2 0.1 2 0.2 0.1 0.1
3 0.2 0.1 0.3 3 0.1 0.1 0.2
Suppose one is interested in the convergence or divergence of material input coefficients of 
industry 1 (j=1), in this small set of countries. According to equation (3), we first compute 
( ) ( ) 2.02.02.02
1)1(and,25.03.02.02
1)0( 1111 =+==+= aa . In a similar vein, we find  
15.0)1(and,15.0)0(,2.0)1(,2.0)0( 31312121 ==== aaaa . These average input coefficients for 
the first column and the input coefficients themselves yield v11(0) = (0.2-0.25)2 + (0.3-0.25)2
= 0.005 and v11(1) = (0.2-0.2)2 + (0.2-0.2)2 = 0. Similarly, we find v21(0) = 0, v21(1) = 0, v31(0) 
= 0.005 and v21(1) = 0.005. 
 The above-mentioned cell-specific variances can now be used to compute the pooled 
variances expressed in equation (4): v1(0) = (0.005+0+0.005)/3 = 0.0033 and v1(1) = 
(0+0+0.005)/3 = 0.0017. In this specific case, the pooled variance for industry 1’s material 
inputs has decreased. To get insight into the strength of this process, we compute the ration 
between  v1(1) and v1(0), which is 0.50 and compare this value to )05.0(22F = 0.053. The 
observed ratio is much larger, so the tendency towards convergence would not be sufficient to 
warrant inclusion as C* in Table 2.   
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Table 1: Availability and grouping of OECD tables 
“1971” AU(68) CA(71) DK(72) FR(72) JP(70) NL(72) UK(68) US(72)
“1976” AU(74) CA(76) DK(77) FR(77) GE(78) JP(75) NL(77) US(77)
“1980” CA(81) DK(80) FR(80) JP(80) NL(81) UK(79) US(82)
“1985” AU(86) CA(86) DK(85) FR(85) GE(86) JP(85) NL(86) UK(84) US(85)
“1990” AU(89) CA(90) DK(90) FR(90) GE(90) JP(90) UK(90) US(90)
Note:  First column contains labels for subperiods. Values between parentheses refer to years. 
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Table 2. Convergence and divergence of sectoral input structures in the OECD, 1971-1990. 
Industry 71-76 C/D 76-80 C/D 80-85 C/D 85-90 C/D 71-90 C/D 
1 0.695 C*** 1.072  0.714 C** 0.823 C* 0.438 C***
2 0.970 0.769 C** 0.746 C** 1.408 D*** 0.783 C* 
3 0.791 C* 1.219  0.730 C** 1.190  0.838  
4 1.072 0.774 C* 1.283 D* 0.709 C*** 0.755 C** 
5 0.587 C*** 1.263 D** 0.686 C*** 1.243 D* 0.632 C***
6 1.042 1.113 0.655 C*** 1.084  0.824 C* 
7 1.406 D** 0.910  0.696 C*** 1.147  1.020  
8 0.918 0.219 C*** 4.328 D*** 0.422 C*** 0.367 C***
9 0.747 C** 1.023  0.988  1.504 D*** 1.136  
10 0.969  1.119  0.938  1.203  1.223 D* 
11 0.969  0.362 C*** 1.194  1.033  0.433 C***
12 1.074  0.918  1.257 D* 1.093  1.354 D** 
13 1.033  0.940  0.759 C** 2.180 D*** 1.606 D***
14 1.109  1.337 D** 1.265 D* 1.563 D*** 2.934 D***
15 1.928 D*** 0.778 C* 1.086  1.363 D** 2.220 D***
16 0.965  0.792 C* 0.946  0.984  0.711 C** 
17 0.845 C* 0.771 C* 0.849  0.807 C* 0.446 C***
18 0.761 C** 0.770 C** 0.991  1.052  0.611 C***
19 0.882  1.862 D*** 0.796 C* 1.104  1.444 D***
20 1.174  0.548 C*** 1.187  1.094  0.836  
21 0.738 C** 0.574 C*** 1.457 D*** 0.979  0.604 C***
22 0.810 C* 0.826  1.157  1.152  0.892  
23 0.523 C*** 0.985  1.094  1.483 D*** 0.837  
24 0.559 C*** 1.362 D** 0.616 C*** 2.847 D*** 1.336 D** 
25 0.537 C*** 0.469 C*** 0.806 C* 1.181  0.240 C***
Total C: 
D:
11 
 2
11 
 4
10 
 5 
 4 
8
12 
 7
Notes: The numbers represent the ratios of pooled variances between the final year and the initial year of the 
periods indicated in the column headings, for the industries in the corresponding rows (see equation 
(4)).    
 The letter C indicates ‘significant’ convergence. In this case *, **, and *** show that the observed ratio 
is smaller than the 10th, 5th, or 1st percentile, respectively, of the corresponding F-distribution. The 
letter D indicates ‘significant’ divergence. In this case, *, **, and *** show that the observed ratio is 
larger than the 90th, 95th, or 99th percentile, respectively, of the corresponding F-distribution. 
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